Fuel Fabrication
| Types of facilities | ||
|---|---|---|
 INES 2 |
Worker injured and contaminated at the French MOX processing plant MELOX |
On 26 July 2004, at the MOX fuel processing facility Melox, during a maintenance operation in a glove box, the hand of a worker was injured by a contaminated mechanical equipment drop. The wound has been decontaminated and required a small surgical operation. There was no contamination spread in the installation and this event had no environmental consequence.
INES [N/A] |
Chemical Explosion at fuel fabrication facility |
On Sunday, the 17.11.2002 early morning around 0415 hrs, there was a blast in the thermo syphon evaporator unit of Natural Uranium Oxide Fuel Plant (NUOFP) at Nuclear Fuel Complex Hyderabad, which concentrates Uranyl Nitrate Solution. This unit is under use since the inception of NUOFP (more than 4 years). About 100 litres of solution containing 100 gm per litre of Uranium spilled in the floor of the Plant. The spilled solution has been later cleaned and floor has been de-contaminated. There was no injury to the plant personnel.
INES 4 |
Workers exposed to radiation at conversion test building of JCO Co., Ltd., Tokai Works |
Time: About 10:35 a.m., Thursday, September 30, 1999. Place: Conversion Test Building, JCO, Ltd.
An area radiation monitor was activated at the Conversion Test Building of the JCO Co., Ltd. Three workers were exposed to radiation and were taken to National Institute of Radiological Science. Two of them seriously. Details are being investigated.
INES 0 |
Fire involving used extract ventilation filters |
A number of ventilation filters set alight causing minor fire (outside building 633, enriched Uranium Chemical facility, formerly EURRP) which was brought under control by the sites own emergency services within about half an hour. Lancashire County Fire Brigade were called out as a precautionary measure and assisted in dampening down the fire. Nobody was hurt and there is no effect on members of the public. An investigation is being set up to establish the cause of the incident.
INES 2 |
ELEVATED URANIUM LUNG BURDEN |
Routine bi-annual whole body monitoring of a process operator who works in a Hex to urianium dioxide conversion showed a higher than normal burden of uranium in the lungs. Subsequent monitoring has indicated that the worker may have exceeded 50 mSv CEDE. Further monitoring over a period of weeks is still required to enable a final confirmation of the dose. Routine surveillance of uranium air levels in the plant has not revealed any unusual results and no other workers have been affected.
INES 2 |
PROLONGED LOSS OF VENTILATION IN THE FUEL FABRICATION BUILDING IN THE FBFC ESTABLISHMENT |
Following a loss of normalized emergency ventilation and non compliance with procedures, the operators worked for over an hour without dynamic containment. Measurements of atmospheric contamination did not provide any evidence of an increase in atmospheric contamination. Failure of all extracted ventilation systems linked to the presence of common mode between the electrical power supplies to these ventilation systems. Lack in the transmission procedure of the alarm.
INES 2 |
CONTAMINATION OF WORKERS DUE TO THE RUPTURE OF A MIXED OXIDE FUEL ROD DURING FABRICATION |
During the fabrication of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel elements at 5% plutonium oxide enrichment a rod was detached from the insertion device and was therefore incompletely inserted in the squeleton. During the next operations, the rod was broken by mechanical interaction with a tool. The workshop was contaminated by plutonium oxide. Eight workers were slightly contaminated externally; one of them was contaminated internally but at a level less than the limit.
As the scale extension for non reactor is no yet implemented, no official rating is available.
INES 2 |
VIOLATION OF SAFETY REGULATIONS AT A WORKSHOP IN THE FUEL FABRICATION PLANT |
On Tuesday, 4 June, inspectors from the safety authority (Department for the Safety of Nuclear Installations - DSIN - and the Rhone-Alpes regional division) reported that two incidents involving a criticality risk had taken place on 29 and 30 April 1991, in the plant's workshop for the oxide production process.
