On September 5, the Emergencies Ministries of Belarus and Russia will consider an opportunity to conduct joint exercises at the Smolensk Nuclear Power Station, BelTA learnt from Press Secretary of the Emergencies Ministry of Belarus Vitaly Novitsky.
Smolensk
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Belarus, Russia Emergencies Ministries to mull over joint exercises at Smolensk Nuclear Power Station
Saturday, September 6, 2008
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 INES 0 |
UNIT SCRAM DUE TO BLOWHOLE IN EMERGENCY REACTOR COOLING SYSTEM(ECCS) PIPE |
The unit was operating at nominal power. During equipment routine examination/inspection a blowhole was discovered in the weld in the pipeline of water supply from the "non-emergency reactor side" pump of the emergency reactor cooling system (ECCS or SAOR) to ECCS header. In accordance with the Technical Specification personnel scrammed the reactor.
No degradation of radiological situation in the controlled area and on site occurred.
Basis for rating:
Safety function availability - full
INES 3 |
BREACH OF UNIT LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION WHILE PREPARING FOR RESTART AFTER MAINTENANCE DUE TO ECCS AND MSV UNAVAILABILITY |
On completion of unit preventive maintenance at Ntherm. - 655 MW and Nnom. 0 MW testing and adjustment of Main Safety Valves (MSVs) was in progress. Four MSVs have been tested in turn, and only one pilot valve (PV) functioned as designed during the test. The remaining PVs failed to completely close (remotely) and were giving oil steam. This led to pressure increase in the sealed rooms up to the setpoint of AZ-5 emergency protection actuation. A maximum design-basis accident signal was formed (MDBA signal) in the protection systems logic. Group 1 hydrovolumes of ECCS were activated.
INES 1 |
DEVIATION FROM THE NORMAL ON-LOAD REFUELING REGIME DUE TO FUEL ASSEMBLY SEPARATION FROM THE CONNECTING BAR |
The unit was operating at nominal power. While performing scheduled refueling (replacement) of a spent fuel assembly (FA) in the 41-40 fuel channel FA separation from the connecting bar occurred, which is a deviation from the normal refueling process. In accordance with the technical specification the unit was scrammed by emergency protection system button. The 41-40 returned to its usual location. Radiation situation in the central hall, sanitary-protective zone and in the supervision area remained unchanged. Breach of unit limiting conditions for operation was not observed.
INES 1 |
TURBINE SJAES STEAMING DUE TO PLANT PERSONNEL ERROR |
The unit was operating at nominal power. Thermal Instrumentation and Controls Service (TICS) shift personnel admitted TICS maintenance personnel to perform work on hydrogen content monitoring sensors at the outlet of moisture separator of the hydrogen reburn facility without informing Turbine Service operating personnel and plant deputy shift supervisor. While performing work on one of the sensors spurious signal of hydrogen concentration increase to 0.4% was formed.
INES 1 |
LOSS OF POWER SUPPY TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS DUE TO 6 KV CABLE FIRE |
While testing automatic activation of 6 kV auxiliary power bus standby source of Unit 1 which was in maintenance and due to switching overvoltages, standby boiler's 6 kV cable insulation was damaged resulting in cable short-circuiting and burning. This resulted in the damage to Unit 2 cables laid nearby, deenergizing of two 6 kV auxiliary power buses, loss of power to two reactor coolant pumps causing the actuation of reactor scram. Breach of safe operation limits and conditions did not occur. Radiation situation remained normal. No injuries occurred while extinguishing the fire.
