INES-event
INES 2

ESSENTIAL BUS DEENERGIZATION

Safety System train 3 DG started on 6 kV bus deenergization. This was followed by DG trip by the maximum current protection of the DG excitation system. After connecting the essential bus to the service bus and following unsuccessful attempt to start the service water pumps for essential consumers (SWPEs-5,6) damage to manway hatch of the service water system was discovered.
Essential bus deenergiztion was caused by the short circuit in the "redundant complex" cable provided for by initial design and later disconnected from one end only.
SS trains 1 and 2 testing was performed on time. 16 hours 55 min. later SS train 3 was successfully tested with sequential loading. During the event the unit was operating at 760 MWe power.
BASIS FOR RATING: Initiator - expected, real (essential bus deenergization). Safety function availability - within limits and conditions. According to Table A2 - level 1/2 (B-1R). Level 2 has been chosen since the event reveals safety culture deficiencies.
DIFFICULTIES IN RATING:

Location: SOUTH UKRAINE-1
Event date: Sat, 01-12-1990
Nuclear event report
Legenda & explanation